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Abstract 
Political scientists have developed several theories to explain how the United States 
Congress organizes its committees. According to the informational theory, members of Congress 
view committees as the most efficient way to divide the labor associated with processing a broad 
range of bills. Since it would be impossible for each individual member to have expertise in 
every policy area, information-gathering responsibility is distributed among the different 
Members through the committee system. Committees provide information about policy 
outcomes and produce legislation preferred by a majority of Members. According to the partisan 
model, on the other hand, committees are organized primarily to support the political agenda of 
the majority party. My study tests the extent to which these two theories explain committee 
organization in the Virginia General Assembly. I put forth and test several hypotheses based on 
the predictions of these two theories, using data on the occupational backgrounds, party 
affiliation, and ideological preferences of General Assembly members. I find that both 
informational and partisan theory apply in the General Assembly. Differences in organization 
between committees can be explained by chamber rules, policy types, and the size of the party 
majority. A House rule requiring proportional representation on committees has resulted in a 
more informational model for the House. In the Senate, which has no such rule, committees 
conform more to the expectations of the partisan theory. Committees that control important 
issues like business and government spending tend to be organized more along the lines of the 
partisan model, whereas committees with specialized jurisdictions in areas like agriculture and 
transportation follow a more informational model. Committees that control important but 
specialized issues like the legal system show a mix of partisan and informational characteristics. 
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Introduction and Research Question 
Over the past three decades, the Virginia General Assembly has transitioned from a 
century of unified Democratic control to an era of increasing electoral competition and split 
governance. After a century of Democratic majorities, the House of Delegates spent almost two 
decades as a Republican stronghold before a Democratic takeover in 2020. The Virginia Senate 
has proved more competitive in the twenty-first century, with some years of unified Republican 
control between the House and Senate and some years when Republican majorities in the House 
were countered by Democratic majorities in the Senate. The swearing-in of the first female 
Speaker of the House of Delegates in 2020 signals that change for the General Assembly may 
not yet be over. As the legislature continues through this new chapter of its four hundred year 
history, it is important to understand the institutional practices that undergird the General 
Assembly’s work, particularly as it relates to the organization of committees—the “heart of the 
legislative process” (Finch, Maddrea, and Garrett 2012, 66). 
Two  primary modes of explaining congressional committee organization come from the 
work of Keith Krehbiel (1991) and Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins (1993). According to 
these scholars’ respective theories, committees attempt to produce policy in line with either the 
preferences of the chamber as a whole (informational theory) or the preferences of the majority 
party (partisan theory). With a few exceptions (Battista 2006), applications of these theories in 
the literature have largely occurred within the context of the U.S. Congress or in cross-state 
comparisons, rather than within specific states. My research determines the extent to which 
informational and partisan theory explain committee organization in the Virginia General 
Assembly.  
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Based on each theory, I develop hypotheses that predict committee makeup in terms of 
members’ occupational background, partisan affiliation, and ideological preferences. I find that 
the House and Senate exhibit characteristics of both the informational and partisan models. 
However, partisan theory explains committee organization in the Senate more so than in the 
House, whose rules restrain the majority party from disproportionately assigning its own 
members to committees. In addition to differences between chambers, the applicability of 
informational and partisan theories also varies by committee and by session. Committees that 
control important issues like business and government spending tend to follow a more partisan 
model, while committees with specialized jurisdictions in areas like agriculture and 
transportation follow a more informational model. Committees like Courts of Justice, which 
control important but specialized issues, show a mix of partisan and informational 
characteristics. Moreover, the analysis produced some evidence that partisan organization is 
more prevalent during when the majority controls the chamber by a narrow margin.  
Theoretical Background     
For most of the twentieth century, studies of legislative committees were dominated by 
distributional theory, which theorizes committees as groups of homogenous, high-demanding 
legislators who use logrolling to pass bills which may be adverse to majority interests. In the 
1990s, Krehbiel (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) challenged the distributional consensus 
with alternative models for committee organization. Their respective informational and partisan 
theories have since become foundational to studies of legislative organization, initially in the 
United States House of Representatives but later extending to state legislatures. 
Krehbiel’s book Information and Legislative Organization argues that the distributional 
model fails to account for the importance of informational concerns in legislative organization. 
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Based on the assumption that legislatures seek to acquire the greatest possible knowledge 
regarding policy outcomes, Krehbiel proposes an informational framework in which legislatures 
are organized to maximize the degree to which the actual outcomes of a particular policy align 
with those preferred by the majority of legislators. To that end, legislatures attempt “to capture 
gains from specialization” (5) by assigning committee members who, through seniority or 
personal and legislative experience, will have the most knowledge about policy in the 
committee’s jurisdiction. At the same time, legislatures try to create committees that will 
produce legislation in line with the preferences of median legislators. Krehbiel uses game theory 
models to develop empirical expectations about how distributive and informational theories 
would play out through assignment and composition of committees, the use of restrictive rules, 
and the procedural enforcement of logrolling deals. He then compares these expectations with 
data from legislative sessions in the U.S. House of Representatives. Krehbiel concludes that the 
House rarely creates committees of homogenous high-demanders, as the distributional theory 
would have predicted. Exceptions to this trend mostly occur when high-demanders can offer 
low-cost specialization in a particular policy area, offsetting the desire for majority-preferred 
policy with informational capacity. Krehbiel also produces evidence that special rules and post-
floor procedures are not used to facilitate gains from trade, suggesting that the House does not 
operate in a fashion consistent with a distributive mode of organization. Importantly, Krehbiel 
argues that committees, as informational bodies, serve as ideological reflections of the chamber 
and produce policies amenable to the median legislator.  
Cox and McCubbins, in Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, instead 
contend that committees serve the interests of the majority party. Their partisan or cartel theory 
holds that individual legislators in the majority party see their electoral success as more closely 
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tied to the party’s actions than to the legislature’s. Therefore, both the legislators and the 
committees which they control take actions which will support the preferences of the majority 
party, rather than simply supplying the floor with information about policy outcomes. Cox and 
McCubbins further support the cartel theory by pointing out the procedural mechanisms that 
grant majority party leadership in the House of Representatives control over committee 
organization, encouraging committee outcomes supported by the majority party. These 
mechanisms include discretion in assigning committee members and chairs, allotting committee 
tasks and resources, and scheduling hearings for committee bills on the floor. The final 
consequence of such control is that “[most] bills reported from committee are sponsored by 
members of the majority party and come to the floor with the support of almost all the majority 
party’s committee contingent” (244), a reflection of tight party control inducing party-friendly 
outcomes at the committee level. Once on the floor, Cox and McCubbins find that “non-
committee Democrats agreed with the decisions of most committees most of the time,” and 
certainly supported committee decisions more than did non-committee Republicans (245). Cox 
and McCubbins use these findings to support their thesis: that committees do not act as 
autonomous agents within the legislature, but rather are firmly bound by the goals and aims of 
the majority party. 
Whereas Krehbiel, Cox, and McCubbins restrict their research to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, other scholars have applied informational and partisan theories of committee 
organization to the legislatures meeting in state houses across America. Overby and Kazee 
(2000) demonstrate that these models can and should be applied to state legislatures. Their 
analysis of twelve state lower chambers shows that state legislatures rarely form outlying 
committees, either in terms of alignment between committee members and the floor or between 
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committee party delegation and party caucus. Similarly, taking a larger sample size, Prince and 
Overby (2005) interpret the rareness of preference outliers among state committees as supporting 
the informational theory. However, they also point out that the relatively greater “evidence of 
outliers among party delegations on committees provides some support for the party-dominant 
theory” (68, emphasis added), noting that majority parties might appoint more extreme members 
to certain committees to counter minority delegations. Thus, it is possible that both informational 
and partisan theories may apply in either chamber of the General Assembly. 
Further research has built upon the foundation laid down by this early scholarship, 
providing more evidence of both informational and partisan organization in state legislatures. In 
support of informational theory, some researchers have pointed to the correlation between policy 
complexity and committee autonomy (Martorano 2006) or the overrepresentation of members 
with prior knowledge, experience, and expertise on certain policy committees (Hamm et al. 
2011). These studies could indicate that legislatures primarily rely on their committees to 
efficiently gather information on policy outcomes. Other scholars have focused on partisan 
theory, demonstrating that committees more often act at the behest of the party when they can 
exercise greater negative agenda control, or when party leadership’s committee appointment 
decisions are not subject to the approval of the full chamber (Anzia and Jackman 2013, Jackman 
2013, Anderson et al. 2016). Majority size can also impact both the autonomy of committees 
relative to party leadership (Francis 1989) and the extent to which committee membership is 
reflective of the chamber’s ideological makeup. Some studies have found that narrow majorities 
produce more committees which are more ideologically reflective of the chamber (Aldrich and 
Batista 2002, Battista 2009), while other studies have found that majorities—and narrow 
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majorities in particular—produce committees whose members’ ideological preferences do not 
reflect those of the chamber (Hedlund et al. 2009, McGrath and Ryan 2019).1  
My research will explore how well the informational and partisan models explain 
committee organization in the House and Senate of the Virginia General Assembly. No study has 
attempted to test legislative organization theories in the General Assembly, as Battista (2006) 
does for the California state legislature. Do committees of the Virginia General Assembly seek 
primarily to serve and reflect the interests of their parent chambers? Or, do they serve as agents 
of the majority party, preventing bills which the party leadership dislikes from making it to the 
floor and advancing those which the leadership likes? In addition to analyzing the relevance of 
the informational and partisan theories to the General Assembly, I will compare the Senate and 
House committee systems. I develop hypotheses to test the informational and partisan models in 
both the House and Senate and test them with data provided by the Virginia Public Access 
Project, Virginia’s Legislative Information System, and the American Legislatures project.  
General Assembly Background 
The Virginia General Assembly, like most state legislatures, is bicameral, with a lower 
chamber of one hundred members (the House of Delegates, or House) and an upper chamber of 
forty members (the Senate). Delegates, each of whom represents approximately 80,000 Virginia 
 
1
 David Rohde’s (1991) theory of conditional party government specifies the role of party in committee organization 
and legislative outcomes. Under this theory, the majority party leadership’s power to use committees in advancing a 
partisan agenda depends on the degree of party unity; more homogenous parties delegate more power to party 
leadership, who in turn serve the collective electoral goals of the party. Empowered leadership appoints committee 
delegations representative of the caucus, resulting in more representative committees overall. According to Rohde’s 
model, the primary agent whom legislative committees serve can change over time: “as partisan-based elections 
increasingly elect members whose policy preferences are similar within and differentiated between the two parties, 
these members choose to strengthen partisan organization within the [legislature]” (Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 546). 
Under a less polarized system, therefore, committees should not be as beholden to the preferences of the majority 
party and its leadership. The opposite is also true; more polarized parties produce committees that are more 
responsive to the party leadership and the preferences of the majority party. Aldrich and Battista (2002) provide 
evidence that the conditional party government model can explain committee organization in state legislatures. 
Unfortunately, insufficient data on polarization in Virginia meant that I was unable to test conditional party 
government theory in the General Assembly. 
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citizens, serve for two-year terms, while senators represent approximately 200,000 citizens each 
and serve four-year terms. Beyond differences in size, the unique rules of each chamber may 
affect the way that they organize their respective committees. This section addresses key 
differences in the chambers’ leadership structures, their committee systems, and their electoral 
history. 
Chamber Characteristics 
Proceedings in the House are dominated by the Speaker of the House, who has the power 
to make committee appointments, designate committee chairs, and assign bills to committees. 
According to former Speaker William Howell, the Virginia House Speakership is generally 
recognized as an unusually strong one, with considerably more power over legislative 
proceedings than speakers in other state lower chambers. Howell referenced South Carolina and 
Georgia as states where the Rules Committees, rather than House Speakers, determine committee 
membership and bill assignment. In Virginia, the Speaker exercises both of these powers. 
Virginia House Speakers may, as Howell did, choose to work with a “kitchen cabinet” of key 
majority party members who provide advice on assignments. As the leader of the majority party, 
Speakers may also seek to accommodate the requests of party members when possible. After 
receiving this input, the Speaker has final say in all decisions, and challenges from other 
legislators are infrequent. In the committee assignment process under Howell, members were 
expected to take the initiative in making their preferences known to the Speaker. However, input 
from the minority party and its leadership was rarely taken into account (W. Howell, personal 
communication, November 9, 2020).  
Since 1998, the rules of the House of Delegates have required that Speakers implement 
proportional representation of the two major parties on every committee except for Rules. The 
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change came about because of a partisan shift that allowed Republicans to share power with 
Democrats in 1998 and 1999, after decades of unchallenged Democratic control. By pushing for 
the adoption of a rule to require proportional representation on committees, newly empowered 
Republicans hoped to end what they considered to be a history of unfair committee assignments 
that overrepresented Democrats on key committees and packed Republicans onto powerless 
committees like Interstate Cooperation (Christman 2018).  
In contrast to the House, the Senate does not empower a single actor like the Speaker 
with the power to make committee assignments. Rather, according to the rules of the Senate, the 
majority caucus submits a nominations report for committee membership elections. This list of 
nominations must then be agreed to by a majority of the Senate. During my time observing the 
2020 session of the Virginia Senate, the majority leader, in consultation with committee chairs, 
appeared to lead the process of deciding membership recommendations. Majority party 
leadership engaged in dialogues with both majority and minority membership to craft a 
nominations report that would achieve the necessary support from the full chamber. Although 
Senate rules facilitate a more consultative assignment process than the House, they do not 
require proportional representation on committees. In theory, this would allow a Senate majority 
to overrepresent their own members on key committees. 
In addition to differences in rules, the House and Senate differ in their traditions and 
bipartisan relations. For example, multiple observers have described the Senate as more collegial 
and inclined to bipartisanship than the House. Laura Vozzella, who covers Virginia politics for 
the Washington Post, noted that “although they are politically divided, [the senators] actually all 
like each other … Even after some very heated floor sessions, they all basically like and respect 
each other” (L. Vozzella, personal communication, April 22, 2020). Senator Jennifer McClellan, 
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who spent ten years in the House before her election to the Senate, attributed this difference to 
the upper chamber’s smaller size and the longer tenure of its members. “When you’re forty, it’s 
hard to be partisan and petty and take things personally,” she said, adding that with four-year 
terms, senators do not have to spend all of their time thinking about reelection (J. McClellan, 
personal communication, April 22, 2020). By contrast, the greater size and continual 
campaigning of House members translates into greater competition and vitriol in relations 
between delegates. These differences in atmosphere may produce differences in legislative 
outcomes. Anecdotally, I have both personally observed and been told by Assembly staff and 
elected officials that the collegiality between senators leads them to pass more moderate, 
bipartisan legislation than their House counterparts.  
Committee Systems in the House and Senate 
Over the twenty-six year period covered by this study, the House has reorganized its 
committees several times, while the Senate committee structure has remained constant. In 1998, 
the House replaced the Nominations Committee with a committee on Science and Technology. 
Four years later, the House consolidated four committees (Agriculture, Chesapeake and Its 
Tributaries, Conservation and Natural Resources, and Mining and Mineral Resources) into one 
(Agriculture, Chesapeake, and Natural Resources), while Corporations, Insurance and Banking, 
and Labor and Commerce became Commerce and Labor. The virtually powerless Interstate 
Cooperation Committee was done away with, as was the Claims Committee, taking the House 
from twenty committees to fourteen. When Democrats took control of both chambers in 2020, 
they did not amend the committee structure, although a couple of committees were renamed to 
more accurately reflect their existing jurisdictions: the House Commerce and Labor Committee 
was renamed Labor and Commerce, and House Science and Technology was renamed 
COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY         13 
Communications, Technology and Innovation. Also in 2020, the Senate Courts of Justice 
Committee was renamed Judiciary; and Senate Finance was renamed Finance and 
Appropriations. Thus, as of 2020, the General Assembly had twenty-five total committees: 
fourteen in the House and eleven in the Senate. A list of these committees can be seen in Table 1. 
Unless otherwise specified by parentheticals in Table 1, the 2020 committee names will be used 
to refer to committees in all sessions. 
Table 1. General Assembly Committees in 2020 
House Committees Senate Committees 
Agriculture, Chesapeake and Natural 
Resources (Agriculture) 
Agriculture, Conservation and Natural 
Resources (Agriculture) 
Appropriations Commerce and Labor (Commerce) 
Communications, Technology and Innovation 
(Technology) 
Education and Health 
Counties, Cities, and Towns (Counties) Finance and Appropriations (Finance) 
Courts of Justice (Courts) General Laws and Technology (General 
Laws) 
Education Judiciary (Courts) 
Finance Local Government 
General Laws Privileges and Elections (P&E) 
Health, Welfare and Institutions (Health) Rehabilitation and Social Services 
(Rehabilitation) 
Labor and Commerce (Commerce) Rules 
Privileges and Elections (P&E) Transportation 
Public Safety  
Rules  
Transportation  
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Prior to the 2002 reorganization of House committees, senators and delegates would each 
serve on approximately four committees. Since 2002, senators usually still serve on four 
committees, while delegates usually serve on three committees. Most Senate committees have 
fifteen members, although Rules, Commerce, or Finance may have one or two more members, in 
keeping with their relative prestige and power. By contrast, Local Government, P&E, and 
Transportation may have fewer members; for instance, in the 2016 session all three of these 
committees had just thirteen members. In the House, committees since 2002 have usually had 
twenty-two members, with the exception of Rules, which has a membership closer to fifteen, and 
Appropriations, which may have a membership above or below average. Before 2002, 
committees varied much more widely in membership size. 
Electoral History 
Because of changes in Virginia’s partisan orientation between 1996 and 2020, control of 
the two General Assembly chambers has gone back and forth over the years. After the end of 
Democratic control with a 50-50 partisan split in 1998 and 1999, the House was a reliably 
Republican institution until 2020, when Democrats gained a ten-seat majority. The tie in 1998 
and 1999 resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the two major parties, with divided 
control of committees. The Senate had a similar power-sharing agreement from 1996 to 2000. 
While the Senate had two other instances of 20-20 splits in 2012 and 2014, in these cases the 
balance of power was determined by the Lieutenant Governor, who serves as President of the 
Senate, and is allowed to vote on legislation in the event of a tie. In 2012, while Democrats and 
Republicans both held twenty seats, the Senate was controlled by Republicans under the 
Republican Lieutenant Governor at the time, Bill Bolling. In 2014, when Ralph Northam became 
Lieutenant Governor, party control in the Senate transferred to the Democrats. After the end of 
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Democratic control in the Senate in 1996, Democrats held a majority of Senate seats only in 
2008, 2010, and 2020. 
Hypotheses 
 Based on the theoretical and legislature backgrounds previously described, I formulate 
hypotheses that anticipate certain outcomes in committee makeup. These hypotheses are divided 
into sections based on the specific theories that they address and the metrics used to assess 
committee membership.  
Informational Theory and Talent-Tapping 
Under informational theory, committees are organized to produce legislation with 
predictable outcomes that are in alignment with the preferences of the chamber majority. Ideally, 
committees should achieve these ends at minimal cost to the chamber in terms of information-
gathering. To that end, legislatures assign committee members who can reduce uncertainty about 
policy outcomes within a given jurisdiction to the greatest degree, but at the least cost. Krehbiel 
(1991) accounts for this tendency in his seminal work on informational theory, theorizing that 
unrepresentative committees emerge because their members, despite being preference outliers 
within the chamber, have the most to offer in terms of low-cost expertise and information 
gathering. For example, a legislature may attempt to “tap the talents” of its members by 
assigning legislators with professional experience in a certain field to a committee whose policy 
jurisdiction overlaps with that field (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011). If informational theory 
applies in the General Assembly, where part-time legislators engage in separate occupations 
outside of their policymaking roles, then this sort of talent-tapping should be visible. Health care 
professionals should be overrepresented on health-related committees, lawyers should be 
overrepresented on judiciary-related committees, farmers should be overrepresented on 
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agriculture-related committees, and so on. In this way, the chamber would obtain the most policy 
expertise at the lowest cost of time and resources for information-gathering.  
H1: If informational theory applies, then committees will be disproportionately 
made up of legislators whose occupations align with the policy jurisdictions of the 
committees. 
Partisan Theory and Stacking 
 In addition to looking at legislators’ occupations, I look at their party affiliation to 
determine the ratio of majority party members to minority party members in the full chamber and 
in individual committees. Under partisan theory, majority party leadership should attempt to 
prevent minority obstructionism in committee by creating an imbalance of representation that 
favors the majority party, allowing committees to better represent majority party opinions. 
Studies by Hedlund et al. (2009) and Ryan and McGrath (2019) both found evidence of majority 
parties “stacking” committees with their own members. A higher majority-to-minority party 
member (M:m) ratio in committees than in the full chamber would indicate the presence of 
stacking in committees, and thereby provide evidence that partisan theory helps to explain 
committee organization in the General Assembly. 
H2: If partisan theory applies, then the ratio of seats held by the majority party 
compared to the minority party will be greater in committee than in the full 
chamber.  
Additionally, according to Cox and McCubbins (1993), majority party leadership should 
do the most stacking in committees that have a high likelihood of impacting the collective 
electoral fortunes of the majority. The committees that legislators view as more important to 
party image, referred to here as control committees, should have a greater degree of stacking than 
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non-control committees. While studies of the U.S. Congress designate Finance, Appropriations, 
and Rules as control committees, these designations do not translate well to the Virginia General 
Assembly. William Howell, Speaker of the House of Delegates from 2003 to 2018, considers the 
Committees on Appropriations, Commerce and Labor, and Courts of Justice to be the most 
important committees in the House. According to Howell, the Committee on Rules, while 
commonly viewed as an assignment for more senior and influential party members, does little to 
impact the functioning or outcomes of the House (W. Howell, personal communication, 
November 9, 2020). Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the House and Senate 
Appropriations (Finance in the Senate), Commerce and Labor, and Courts of Justice committees 
will be regarded as control committees. 
H3: If partisan theory applies, then the ratio of seats held by the majority party 
compared to the minority party will be greater in control committees than in non-
control committees. 
 In addition to variation between committees, partisan theory predicts that stacking would 
vary across sessions based on the size of the majority party. According to studies by Hedlund, 
Coombs, and Martorano (2009) and McGrath and Ryan (2019), majority party stacking should 
be greater in years with narrower majorities. In theory, less secure majorities should seek to 
prevent minority party obstruction at the committee stage, as well as to ensure that committees 
will not bring legislation to the floor that is likely to divide the majority party and result in a 
losing vote (Anzia and Jackman 2013; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hedlund et al. 2009). To that 
end, majority leadership will seek to tighten their control over committees by overrepresenting 
their party through stacking. 
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H4: If partisan theory applies, then majority overrepresentation on committees 
will be greater when there is a smaller majority-to-minority ratio in the chamber 
than when there is a greater majority-to-minority ratio. 
 For this section of the study, twenty-three total committees will be considered: eleven 
Senate committees, eleven House committees whose jurisdictions have not appreciably changed 
over time, and the House Commerce and Labor committee, for which Corporations is used as a 
proxy before 2002. I consider Corporations to be a reasonable proxy for Commerce and Labor 
because, as former Speaker Howell observed, Commerce and Labor derives the greater part of its 
power from its ability to affect the workings of Virginia businesses (W. Howell, personal 
communication, November 9, 2020). The success of these businesses can impact economic 
growth—and thereby electoral outcomes—across the state. Well-endowed corporations may also 
work to support members of the Commerce and Labor (or Corporations) committee in elections 
in order to garner support on key legislation. Thus, the most “controlling” or significant work of 
Commerce and Labor maps well onto the work formerly done by Corporations. 
Informational Model, Partisan Model, and Ideology Scores  
 In addition to legislators’ occupations and party affiliation, scholars have relied on 
ideology scores derived from roll call votes and questionnaires to test informational and partisan 
theories. In order to determine the ideological preferences of Virginia legislators, I utilize data 
from the American Legislatures project, which Shor and McCarty (2011) use to test spatial 
models of state legislators’ voting patterns. Shor and McCarty derive individual-level ideology 
scores for state legislators based on the legislators’ responses to Project Vote Smart’s National 
Political Awareness Test (NPAT) and roll call votes. Scores for Virginia legislators since 1996 
have ranged from -1.63 to 1.53, with positive scores indicating more conservative preferences 
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and negative scores indicating more liberal preferences. A higher absolute score value indicates a 
more extreme position. The 2020 update to the Shor-McCarty NPAT data sets shows scores for 
General Assembly members in all twelve even-year sessions between 1996 and 2018.  
According to informational theory, committees are organized to produce bills preferred 
by the delegate in the chamber with median ideological preferences, so committee ideological 
makeup should reflect that of the chamber (Krehbiel 1991). By contrast, partisan theory claims 
that committees, especially control committees, should be stacked with loyal partisans who shift 
the ideological balance of the committee in the majority party’s preferred direction. Therefore, if 
informational theory is the model for committee organization in the General Assembly, the 
absolute difference between the committees’ average ideology scores and the chamber medians 
should be less than the absolute difference between the committee averages and the majority 
party median. This outcome would indicate that committees produce legislation preferred by the 
chamber median over the majority party median.  
H5: If informational theory applies, then the median ideology scores of 
committees will be closer to the median ideology score of the full chamber than to 
the median scores of the majority party. 
In the case of H5, if the partisan model guides committee organization, then the opposite 
will be true. Majority party leadership will seek to ideologically stack committees, either by 
overrepresenting the majority party or by assigning more loyal partisans to sit on committees 
with narrower majorities. This results in an ideological stacking that shifts average committee 
ideology scores away from the chamber median and towards the majority party median. Support 
for H5 would indicate an informational model of committee organization, while a lack of support 
would indicate a partisan model. Moreover, if the partisan model applies in the General 
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Assembly, then majority leadership should also seek to achieve more ideological stacking—that 
is, to assign more loyal partisans—to control committees than to non-control committees, to 
ensure majority-supported outcomes in the most electorally significant policy areas.   
H6: If partisan theory applies, then the median ideology scores of control 
committees will be closer to the majority party median than non-control 
committees. 
 Additionally, similar to H4’s test for greater overrepresentation of majority party 
members on committees during sessions with narrower majorities, narrower majorities should 
also lead majority leadership to seek tighter control over committee outcomes by assigning more 
loyal partisans to committees and producing ideological stacking. 
H7: If partisan theory applies, then the median committee ideology scores of 
majority party delegations will be closer to the majority party median in years 
with lesser majority-to-minority ratios in the full chamber than in years with a 
greater majority-to-minority ratio. 
Inter-Chamber Differences 
 For each of the foregoing hypotheses, I will be analyzing data from both the House and 
the Senate. As I draw conclusions about the use of informational and partisan models for 
understanding General Assembly committee function, I will also consider whether my results 
indicate differences between the two chambers.  
In considering whether the House or the Senate is more likely to follow the informational 
model, one could make a case for either chamber. On the one hand, the House has historically 
been less competitive than the Senate, in that it has wider majorities and changes control less 
frequently. This would theoretically decrease the incentives for majorities to engage in more 
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partisan stacking to ensure that they achieve key successes during their time in power. 
Additionally, the House rule requiring proportional committee assignments leaves less latitude 
for partisan stacking by House majorities than by Senate majorities. Both of these characteristics 
could result in a more informational model in the House than in the Senate. 
On the other hand, based on my experience in and around General Assembly offices at 
the Pocahontas Building in Richmond, VA, as well as interviews with important actors in the 
legislative process, the Senate is anecdotally considered to be a more collegial body than its 
larger counterpart, as well as a chamber which values bipartisan cooperation. This non-polarizing 
environment could work against the formation of partisan committees. Party leadership in the 
Senate also does not have the unusually ingrained power possessed by the Speaker of the House 
of Delegates, making party leadership’s control over committee outcomes more uncertain in the 
upper chamber. Additionally, according to Virginia’s Legislative Information System, the Senate 
continuously introduced a greater number of bills relative to its members than has the House 
since at least 1996. Theoretically, this difference would indicate a greater value on information-
gathering via committee organization in the Senate than in the House. 
Taking into consideration the differences between the chambers in terms of electoral 
competitiveness, rules, and bipartisanship, I anticipate that both chambers could feasibly engage 
in more partisan or more informational forms of organization.  
H8: The information model is as likely to explain organization of Senate 
committees as House committees. 
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Methods and Results 
 This section explains the method by which I tested my hypotheses, as well as the results 
of those tests. The hypotheses are tested in the order they were presented, grouped into 
subsections for occupation data, party affiliation, and ideology scores. 
Testing the Informational Model: Occupation Data (H1) 
I begin by testing my hypothesis that if informational theory applies in the General 
Assembly, then committees will be disproportionately made up of legislators whose occupations 
align with the policy jurisdictions of the committees (H1). My data for testing this hypothesis 
comes from two sources. The first is the Legislative Information System (LIS) maintained by 
Virginia’s Division of Legislative Automated Services. LIS provides extensive information on 
committee membership, daily floor and committee proceedings, and bill histories for every 
session of the General Assembly going back to 1994. Based on the information contained in LIS, 
I assigned legislators a binary variable for committee membership in each committee of the 
relevant chamber and session, with “1” representing committee membership and “0” 
representing committee non-membership. My second source of data for this test was the Virginia 
Public Access Project (VPAP), a nonpartisan not-for-profit organization which promotes 
campaign finance transparency and provides access to information on Virginia politicians, 
including the demographic, partisan, and occupational makeup of Virginia’s legislative 
chambers. For the past eight regular sessions of the General Assembly, VPAP has classified 
senators and delegates within a set of twelve occupation groups. This study focuses on even-year 
sessions (that is, post-election sessions, 60-day sessions, or budget sessions), and presents 
occupational data from four such sessions: 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020.  
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For the House, I will examine the Agriculture, Commerce, Courts, Education, and Health 
Committees. For the Senate, I will examine the Commerce, Education and Health, and Courts 
Committees. I selected these committees because of their significance in terms of policy focus, 
as well as their clear relationship to certain occupation classifiers listed by VPAP. Following the 
model of Hamm, Hedlund, and Post (2011), I created a data set for each of the selected 
committees in each of the selected sessions. Committee members were assigned a binary code 
based on the relevance or irrelevance of their occupation field, with “1” representing a relevant 
occupation field and “0” representing an irrelevant occupation field. The occupations assumed to 
be “relevant” to each committee are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Committees and Relevant Occupation Fields 
 Committee Occupation 
House  Agriculture Farmers/Agriculture 
Commerce Business People 
Courts of Justice Lawyers 
Education Educators 
Health Medical Professions 
   
Senate Commerce Business People 
Courts Lawyers 
Education and Health Educators; Medical Professions 
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For each committee, I find the proportion of members in the full chamber with the 
relevant occupation field and the proportion of committee members with the relevant occupation 
field. I then calculate the hypothetical committee occupation proportion at which there is the 
least absolute difference between the committee and chamber proportions without altering the 
size of the committee. I then determine how many committee members with a relevant 
occupation would need to be replaced by members with irrelevant occupations to achieve the 
expected occupation proportion.  
Take the 2016 House Courts Committee as an example. In 2016, a total of twenty-three 
delegates were occupied in some aspect of the legal profession, resulting in a Courts-related 
occupation proportion of .23 for the chamber. The Courts Committee has twenty-two members. 
If five of these members represented Courts-related professions, then the committee occupation 
proportion would be .227, which is the closest possible value to the chamber proportion of .23 
without altering the size of the committee. The 2016 House Courts Committee had fifteen 
members with relevant occupations, making the actual committee occupation proportion .682. 
Ten of these specialized members would need to be replaced by nonspecialized members to 
achieve the committee occupation proportion that is most representative of the chamber 
occupation proportion. Thus House Courts overrepresents occupational specialists, illustrating a 
strong preference for information based organization on this committee.  
Table 3 displays the number of members with a relevant occupation that would need to 
be replaced with nonspecialists to make their committees more representative of the chamber 
occupation proportion. A positive value indicates that the profession in question is 
overrepresented on the committee, supporting the informational model’s argument that 
legislatures seek to “tap the talents” of members who are in relevant occupational fields. A 
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negative value indicates the opposite: that the relevant occupational field is underrepresented on 
the committee relative to what would be expected in a random assignment. 
The data laid out in Table 3 show that H1 was almost universally true in both chambers. 
Legislators with occupational experience in a certain field are almost always overrepresented on 
committees that legislate on issues related to that field, suggesting that the General Assembly 
does attempt to “tap the talents” of its members. However, the extent to which this 
overrepresentation occurs varies between committees and by sessions. The Courts Committees of 
both chambers are routinely stacked to a greater degree than any other committee. The effect is 
particularly pronounced on House Courts, where as many as eleven more members with law-
related professions will be on the Courts Committee than would be expected in a random 
assignment. The Senate Commerce Committee, as well as the House committees on Agriculture, 
Education, and Health, have overrepresented members with relevant occupations to different 
degrees in different years. By contrast, the Senate Education committee has overrepresented 
educators to the same degree for each of the four sessions studied. Thus, the value of a relevant 
occupational background in Education has remained constant over time, while its value in other 
committees has changed from session to session. 
The only exception to the general pattern of positive values is the House Commerce 
Committee, which was only overrepresented by Business People in the 2020 session. Before that, 
the proportion of Commerce Committee members who were Business People was equal to or 
less than the proportion of all delegates employed in that field. Thus, the House Commerce and 
Labor Committee does not appear to be guided by informational theory, because delegates with 
relevant occupational backgrounds are not disproportionately selected to serve on this 
committee. On the other hand, the overrepresentation of lawyers in Senate and House Courts 
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suggests that the Courts Committees operate under an informational model, where legislators 
with occupational backgrounds in the practice of law are selected to serve on the committee and 
employ their expertise in evaluating legislation.  
Testing the Partisan Model: Party Affiliation Ratios (H2-4) 
My next set of hypotheses looks for evidence of stacking, or majority party 
overrepresentation on committees. If partisan theory applies, then H2 predicts that the ratio of 
seats held by the majority party compared to the minority party will be greater in committee than 
in the full chamber; H3 predicts that the ratio of seats held by the majority party compared to the 
minority party will be greater in control committees than in non-control committees; and H4 
predicts that majority overrepresentation will be greater in years with narrower majorities. To 
Table 3. Difference Between Chamber Occupation Proportions and Committee 
Occupation Proportions 
 Committee 2014 2016 2018 2020 
House Agriculture 4 4 3 1 
Commerce/Labor 0 -1 -1 1 
Courts 11 10 9 11 
Education 1 1 3 1 
Health 4 4 2 4 
 
Senate Commerce/Labor 0 2 1 1 
Courts 6 5 5 6 
Education 2 2 2 2 
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test these hypotheses, I compare the majority-to-minority (M:m) ratios of the full chamber and 
the individual committees.  
I use a similar method to assess the difference between chamber and committee M:m 
ratios as I used to compare chamber and committee occupation ratios. However, rather than 
determine the projected committee M:m ratio at which there would be the least absolute 
difference between the chamber and committee ratios, I found the least committee M:m ratio at 
which the committee ratio would be greater than or equal to the chamber ratio. This modification 
is based on the rules of the House of Delegates, which since 1998 have required proportional 
representation on committees. If it is impossible to achieve exact equality in chamber and 
committee ratios, then committee assignments may err on the side of overrepresenting the 
majority party. While the Senate has no such rule, applying this standard to both chambers will 
allow for a more exact comparison. 
To better understand this method of analysis, consider a Senate chamber with an M:m 
ratio of 22:18 (1.22). A fifteen-member committee created by this chamber has an M:m ratio of 
10:5 (2.00). A committee M:m ratio of 8:7 (1.14) would produce the least absolute difference 
between committee and chamber M:m ratios, but would be less than the chamber ratio. The 
expected committee M:m ratio is therefore 9:6 (1.50), the least possible ratio at which the 
committee M:m ratio could remain greater than or equal to the chamber ratio. In this case, one 
committee member would need to change from majority to minority to bring the committee M:m 
from the actual ratio (10:5) to the expected ratio (9:6). A positive difference between the actual 
and expected ratio indicates that stacking has occurred; the number of committee members who 
would need to change indicates the extent to which it has occurred. This allows me to test for the 
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presence of stacking, and therefore to determine whether the majority party presses its advantage 
in committees, as predicted by the partisan theory. 
Figures 1 and 2 provide results for H2 in the House, with Figure 1 displaying how many 
committees were stacked per session and Figure 2 displaying how often each of the twelve 
committees was stacked out of the fourteen sessions being considered. As Figure 1 shows, 
stacking occurred frequently in the House prior to 1998, when an amendment to the rules 
required proportional representation on all committees except for Rules. In accordance with Rule 
16(a), comparatively few committees have been stacked following the end of power-sharing in 
2000.2 The fact that the House adopted a rule requiring proportional party representation on its 
 
2
 Rule 16(a) reads as follows: “Except for the Committee on Rules, membership on all standing committees and 
subcommittees will be contingent upon membership or nonmembership in the majority party caucus. The 
apportionment of members will be according to the same ratio of members in the House of Delegates who are 
members or nonmembers of the majority party caucus. If such ratio would represent a fractional number of the 
committee or subcommittee membership assigned to the majority party caucus, then the number of majority party 
caucus members will be the next highest whole number of committee or subcommittee members. For the purposes 
of this rule only, members who do not caucus with the majority party caucus or the largest minority party caucus 
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*power-sharing agreement, no majority
Figure 1. Number of House Committees Stacked by Session, 
1994-2020 
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committees, as well as the fact that this rule has largely been adhered to since its adoption, 
suggests that the House has attempted to create an informational committee system that serves 
the full chamber rather than the majority party. Prior to the adoption of this rule, a more partisan 
pattern of majority stacking guided committee assignments. Additionally, disproportionate 
representation on Rules is allowed under Rule 16(a), and House majorities have continued to 
exercise stacking on that committee. The Rules Committee therefore exhibits more partisan 
characteristics than other committees in the post-1998 period, having been stacked more often 
than any other committee.  
There have been some violations of Rule 16(a) since 1998, as seen in 2000, 2002, and 
2010.3 Majority parties have also frequently done as much as possible to overrepresent their 
party while remaining in the bounds of the proportionality rule. For example, in 2008, a unique 
situation allowed Republicans to achieve a 1.44 M:m ratio on many committees despite a 1:2 
M:m ratio in the chamber. An M:m ratio of 1.2 (12:10) could have been achieved in the 22-
person committees had Republicans not made use of an additional rule clarifying that 
independents not caucusing with either party are counted as part of the majority for purposes of 
committee proportionality. Under this rule, independent Delegate Watkins Abbitt, Jr., was 
counted as part of the majority caucus, creating a chamber ratio of 1.22 and allowing 
Republicans to overrepresent themselves on committees. Additionally, both Democratic and 
Republican majorities have made use of the stipulation that committee assignments can err on 
the side of overrepresenting the majority party, rather than requiring that ratios be as close as 
 
3
 By cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, we can determine which non-Rules 
committees were stacked in the post-1998 sessions. In 2000, the non-Rules stacked committee was Courts. In 2002, 
Rules was not stacked, but Commerce, Transportation, and General Laws were. In 2010, Rules was not stacked, but 
Commerce and Transportation were. All other instances of stacking post-1998 (including 2000, 2004, 2016, 2018, 
and 2020) occurred in the Rules committee, as permitted by Rule 16(a) of the House of Delegates. 
COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY         30 
possible. For example, in 2020, the closest possible committee M:m ratio to the 1.22 chamber 
M:m ratio would have been 1.2 for a 22-person committee; however, the Democratic majority 
established 1.44 M:m ratios on most committees. Thus, while the House rules attempt to 
establish an informational model for committee membership, committee assignments since 1998 
suggest that House Speakers still seek to overrepresent their party on committees by exploiting 
certain provisions in Rule 16(a).  
While information theory appears to be more applicable in the House with regards to 
overall frequency of stacking, there is still some evidence for partisan theory in terms of which 
committees are most frequently stacked. In keeping with H3, which predicts a greater incidence 
of stacking on control committees than non-control committees within a partisan model, Figure 2 
shows that Commerce is the most frequently stacked committee aside from Rules. Commerce 
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the proportionality requirement was established in 1998.4 Courts was also stacked at least once 
after the establishment of this requirement, tied with the non-control General Laws committee 
for overall frequency of stacking.5 The relatively high degree of stacking on Commerce and 
Courts, both designated as control committees, suggests that partisan theory is partially true in 
the House, despite the proportional representation rule. Later in this section, examining the 
degree of stacking on control and non-control committees will provide more insight into 
informational and/or partisan arrangements prior to 1998, when the majority of House stacking 
occurred.  
Figures 3 and 4 show stacking by session and by committee for the Senate, with fourteen 
sessions and eleven committees being considered. Stacking occurs much more frequently in this 
chamber than in the House, likely because the Senate has no proportional representation rule. 
Except for 1996 and 1998, when a power-sharing agreement meant that no party had a majority 
of seats, at least three Senate committees have been stacked every year since 1994. This includes 
2012 and 2014, when the Senate had an even split of twenty Democrats and twenty Republicans. 
Democratic senators complained when Republicans used Lieutenant Governor Bill Bolling’s tie 
breaking vote to stack committees in 2012; however, Democrats also engaged in stacking when 
the election of Ralph Northam as Lieutenant Governor gave Democrats an edge in the Senate 
(Gorman 2014). In fact, while Republicans stacked three committees with a 21-20 advantage in 
the chamber in 2012, Democrats stacked five committees while holding the same margin in 
2014. When Democrats returned to power in 2020, they once again engaged in more stacking 
than the previous Republican majority, stacking seven committees to Republicans’ three. While 
 
4
 Cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, shows us that Commerce was stacked in 1994, 
1996, 2002, and 2010. 
5
 Cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, shows us that Courts was stacked in 1994, 
1996, and 2000. General Laws was stacked in 1994, 1996, and 2002. 
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Democrats appear to have stacked more frequently, both committees have engaged in stacking 
when in the majority. In comparison to the House, Senate committee organization follows a more 
partisan model.  
As Figure 4 shows, Senate committees differ in how often they are stacked, 
demonstrating that application of the partisan model varies by committee. Three Senate 
committees—Agriculture, Local Government, and Rehabilitation—were never stacked. 
Meanwhile, the most frequently stacked committees—Commerce, Finance, and Rules—were 
stacked nine, ten, and twelve times, respectively. In accordance with H3’s prediction that greater 
stacking would occur on control committees, two of the three most frequently stacked 
committees were control committees. The last control committee, Courts, was tied for fourth 
most frequently stacked committee, along with Education and P&E. Viewed in conjunction with 
the findings under H1 that Courts disproportionately represents occupational experts (i.e., 
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Figure 3. Number of Senate Committees Stacked by 
Session, 1994-2020
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further evidence that Senate Courts subscribes to an informational model, rather than to a 
partisan model. Overall, however, the lack of a proportionality rule in the Senate and the 
frequency with which majority parties stack committees, especially control committees, 
demonstrates that most Senate committees have a more partisan organization than their House 
counterparts.  
Tables 4 and 5 show results on the degree to which stacking occurs. The values in these 
tables represent the number of majority party members on a committee who would need to be 
replaced by minority party members to achieve a committee M:m ratio representative of the full 
chamber. With regards to H2 and the prediction that committees would overrepresent majority 
parties relative to the chamber, Table 4 shows that stacking in the post-1998 House is rare, and 
the degree of stacking is usually quite small. Actual committee ratios after 1998 were rarely 
more than one member away from the expected ratio, if they differed at all. By contrast, prior to 
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majority of committees were stacked in 1994 and 1996, often by factors greater than one. 
Control committees were stacked by factors of three or more, suggesting prioritization of 
majority control over important committees. While stacking has been significantly reduced since 
1998, the recent upward trend in stacking on the Rules committee suggests that the House may 
be returning to a more partisan model while remaining within the bounds of Rule 16(a).  
Table 4. Degree of Stacking in the House 
values represent the number of majority party committee members who would need to be replaced by minority 
party members to achieve the expected M:m committee ratio 
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- - - - - - - - - - - 
Commerce* 3 3 - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - 
Courts* 3 3 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
Rules 2 2 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 2 3 
Transportation - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - 
Counties - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Education - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finance 2 3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
General Laws 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Health 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
P&E - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Public Safety - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
* control committee  
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Table 5. Degree of Stacking in the Senate 
values represent the number of majority party committee members who would need to be replaced by minority 
party members to achieve the expected M:m committee ratio 
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1 1 2 2 - - 1 1 3 3 4 
Courts* -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 - 2 - 1 1 1 1 
Finance* 3 1 1 1 1 - - 1 2 2 2 2 
Rules 3 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 
Transportation -1 1 1 1 1 - -1 - - - - - 
Agriculture -1 - - - - - -1 - -1 - - - 
Education 1 - - -1 -1 2 1 - 1 - - 1 
GenLaws -1 - - 1 - - -1 - - - - 1 
Local 
Government 
-1 - - -1 -2 -1 - -1 -1 - - - 
P&E - 1 1 - -1 1 1 - - - - 1 
Rehab -1 -1 - -1 -1 - -1 - -1 - - - 
*control committee 
 Table 5 shows that, in addition to stacking more often than the House, the Senate also 
stacks to a greater degree. Senate committees were more frequently stacked by a factor greater 
than one as compared to their House counterparts, excluding the pre-1998 House sessions. 
Senate majorities have also occasionally undersold their advantage on particular committees, 
creating situations in which the actual committee ratio is less than the expected ratio. Since a 
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limited number of majority party members must be distributed among committee seats, and all 
members of the major parties must have a committee seat, it makes sense that a greater degree of 
stacking on some committees would necessitate that other committees have fewer majority party 
members than expected. Local Government and Rehabilitation have both been frequent victims 
of this phenomenon, which maintains majority party control of the committee but narrows the 
margin of control from what would be considered an equitable ratio. By contrast, Rules is always 
stacked to a greater degree than any other committee. The control committees also have 
relatively high degrees of stacking relative to other committees, and especially so in recent years, 
indicating a tendency towards partisan organization that has become stronger in the past few 
sessions. 
The exceptionality of the Rules Committee in these data merits some discussion. While 
the House Rules Committee is the only committee exempted from the proportionality 
requirement, there is not a similar structural explanation for the fact that the Senate Rules 
Committee is stacked more often and stacked to a much greater degree than any other Senate 
committee. I propose two possible explanations for this trend. The first is that the majority party 
prefers to give the prestige posts on Rules to its own members, thereby allowing leadership to 
either reward loyal partisans or curry the favor of more reluctant partisans. Alternatively, the 
Rules Committees may have more sway in the Senate than Howell implied it to have in the 
House. Even if the bills and resolutions considered by the Rules Committee have little direct 
impact on the electorate, Senate leadership may view Rules as a key enabler of the majority 
party’s ability to enact its agenda. 
Next, I test my hypothesis that narrower majorities in the full chamber encourage greater 
stacking in committees. For this analysis, I selected three sessions for the House (2012, 2014, 
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and 2018) and three sessions for the Senate (2004, 2016, and 2018). In the House, I compare two 
sessions when Republicans had a greater than 2:1 majority (2012 and 2014) with a session when 
the party had a narrow two-seat majority (2018). In 2012 and 2014, no stacking occurred, even 
on the Rules committee where disproportionate representation is permitted. In 2018, however, 
Rules was stacked by a factor of two, suggesting that the Republican majority was attempting to 
assert their advantage in this committee.  
In the Senate, I compare a session with an M:m ratio of 1.50 (2004) to two sessions with 
a ratio of 1.04 (2016 and 2018). In 2004, the Republican majority stacked five committees: 
Commerce and Rules by a factor of two; Finance, General Laws and Transportation by a factor 
of one. In 2016 and 2018, navigating just a two-seat majority, the Republicans stacked fewer 
committees, but to a greater degree: Rules by a factor of four, Commerce by a factor of three, 
Finance by a factor of two, and Courts by a factor of one. Republicans in 2018 thus appeared to 
prioritize stacking of control committees. The evidence suggests that in both chambers, when 
majorities become narrower, the majority party engages on a greater degree of stacking to ensure 
control of key committees.  
In summary, I find evidence of stacking in the Virginia General Assembly, but much 
more so in the Senate than in the House. Stacking is also leveraged more frequently on control 
committees than non-control committees. Majority overrepresentation becomes more 
pronounced in situations with a narrower majority in the full chamber. 
Testing the Theories: Ideology Scores (H5-7) 
Having analyzed partisan theory on the basis of party identification, I next turn to 
ideology scores to test further hypotheses for the informational and partisan theories. H5 predicts 
that if informational theory applies in the General Assembly, then the median ideology scores of 
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committees will be closer to the median ideology score of the full chamber than to the median 
scores of the majority (H5). If partisan theory applies, then the opposite will be true. To test this 
theory, I used Shor and McCarty’s NPAT scores for Virginia legislators to calculate median 
NPAT scores for the chamber, for the two major parties, and for a selection of committees. I 
chose to focus on control committees, with Transportation serving as a comparison non-control 
committee.6 I place these different medians in relation to one another for each of the twelve 
sessions for which I had data. This allows me to compare the median NPAT scores of a 
committee with the chamber median, with the majority and majority party medians, and with the 
medians of other committees. Analyzing the data this way also allows me to test my hypothesis 
that, if partisan theory applies in the General Assembly, then the median ideology scores of 
control committees will be closer to the majority party median than non-control committees 
(H6). 
Figure 5 shows median committee NPAT scores for the House between 1996 and 2018 as 
compared to the chamber and party median scores.7 Overall, the data supports H5; most 
committees during this period had median scores closer to the median of the full chamber than to 
that of the majority party. In the majority of committees, median ideology scores fell somewhere 
between the chamber and majority medians, although several committee medians actually fell 
between the medians of the chamber and the minority party. H5 was not universally true within 
this sample: a few committees had median scores closer to the majority party median than to the 
chamber median, and the median score of the 2010 Rules committee fell beyond the majority 
 
6
 I selected Transportation as the non-control committee because, according to former Speaker Howell, while most 
committees deal with some important legislation or policy areas, Transportation is generally viewed as an 
unimportant committee to the extent that it does not deal with legislation that could substantially impact the electoral 
fortunes of the majority party (W. Howell, personal communication, November 9, 2020). 
7
 Further information about the data seen in Tables 5 and 6 can be found in Appendix A.  
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party median. Overall, however, the fact that committee medians tend to reflect the chamber 
median more closely than the majority party median supports informational theory as a predictor 
for House committee organization.   
In terms of the differences between control and non-control committees, the median 
NPAT scores of Courts and Commerce have consistently been among the closest, if not the 
closest to the majority party median as compared to other committees. This corroborates the 
expectations of partisan theory, which anticipates that control committees will be more reflective 
of majority party interests than the interests of the chamber as a whole. Appropriations, despite 
being a control committee, did not display this trend. It usually fell close to the chamber median, 
or even between the chamber and majority party median. Rules has varied between more 
informational and more partisan median scores over the years, making it difficult to tell which 
model more effectively predicts its organization. Transportation is similarly difficult to predict, 
although it appears to be slightly more informational than Rules because its median scores are 
closer to the chamber median than to the majority median. Overall, it appears that H6’s partisan 
model applies to some extent in the House, but predicts the activity of some control 
committees—specifically, Commerce and Courts—more so than others. 






































bolded values represent the Republican median
italicized values represent the Democratic median
underlined values represent the majority party median
* power-sharing agreement, no majority
Figure 5. House Committee Median NPAT Scores Compared to 
Chamber and Party Medians, 1996-2018
Chamber Median Appropriations Commerce Courts Rules Transportation
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 Figure 6 shows chamber, majority party, and committee medians for the Senate. Median 
committee scores in the Senate are much more spread out than in the House, but mostly remain 
in between the chamber and majority medians. There are fewer instances of committee medians 
falling between the chamber and minority party medians, and more instances of committee 
medians being closer to the majority party median than to the chamber medians. Thus, although 
there is evidence for both informational and partisan patterns in Senate committees, the Senate 
appears to have a more partisan organizational bent than the House in terms of ideological 
composition. The Senate Rules Committee in particular is much more partisan than its House 
counterpart. Between 2000 and 2014, the median score for Rules was not only consistently closer 
to the majority party median than to the chamber median, but also closer to the majority party 
median than any other committee. Although the median scores of control committees have varied 
in terms of relative distance from the chamber and majority medians, Commerce and Courts 
have been consistently closer to the majority median than to the chamber median since 2012, 
confirming the expectations of partisan theory under H6. By comparison, the Finance and 
Transportation Committees medians tend to be relatively closer to the chamber median than 
other committees. This mirrors the pattern followed by committees in the House: Commerce and 
Courts have a more partisan ideological makeup, while Finance and Transportation exhibit more 
informational characteristics. These committee-specific findings are interesting in light of what 
has been learned from previous analyses in this study. For example, the partisan trend seen in the 
ideology scores of House and Senate Courts Committees conflicts with these committees’ 
relatively low incidence of stacking in comparison to other control committees, as well as their 
informational “talent-tapping” model. Moreover, the Senate Finance Committee had less partisan 
ideology scores than might have been expected, given how often it has been stacked.  

































bolded values represent the Republican median
italicized values represent the Democratic median
underlined values represent the majority party median
* power-sharing agreement, no majority
Figure 6. Senate Committee Median NPAT Scores Compared to 
Chamber and Party Medians, 1996-2018
Chamber Median Commerce Courts Finance Rules Transportation
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My final hypothesis related to ideology scores predicts that, if partisan theory applies in 
the General Assembly, then the median committee ideology scores of majority party delegations 
will be closer to the majority party median in years with lesser majority-to-minority ratios in the 
full chamber than in years with a greater majority-to-minority ratio (H7). To assess H7, I look 
for a correlation between narrower margins in the full chamber and a smaller difference between 
majority party medians and committee medians. In completing this test, I use data from the same 
twenty-three committees used to test H2-4: twelve House committees and eleven Senate 
committees whose jurisdictions have largely remained the same since 1996. I find the absolute 
difference between the median ideology scores of the majority party and majority committee 
delegations for all sessions. I then determine the correlation coefficient between this absolute 
difference and the chamber ratio, looking for a correlation between smaller majorities and a 
smaller distance between the majority and committee delegation medians. The House correlation 
coefficient for the period 1996-2018 was -0.16738, and the Senate correlation coefficient was  
-0.08793. Both of these values indicate a low degree of correlation between larger chamber 
majorities and smaller distances between majority and committee delegation medians, thus 
contradicting the expectations of H7 and of partisan theory in both chambers. 
Results in Review and Inter-Chamber Comparison 
 My final hypothesis anticipated that the informational theory was equally likely to 
explain committee organization in the Senate, purportedly the more “bipartisan” of the two 
General Assembly chambers, as in the House, which established a rule against partisan stacking 
(H8). Reviewing the results for both chambers contradicts that expectation. Although both 
chambers showed evidence of “talent-tapping” in terms of overrepresenting members with 
certain occupations on committees with relevant jurisdictions, when it came to stacking, the 
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House’s proportional representation rule limited Speakers’ ability to stack committees with 
members of the majority party. The Senate, on the other hand, continued to frequently engage in 
partisan stacking. Furthermore, the most stacking in the Senate took place on the control 
committees, as partisan theory would predict. Finally, an analysis of ideology scores showed 
that, compared to the House, Senate committees were more ideologically similar to the majority 
party median than to the chamber median. Overall, the data showed that the House had a more 
informational organization model than the Senate.  
 From this result, it appears that chamber rules have greater bearing on committee 
organization than House or Senate culture. Partisan theory provides further explanation for this 
outcome. The narrower majorities in the Senate, where the margin of control has never surpassed 
single digits, may encourage more stacking and ideological bias on committees as majority 
parties seek to consolidate their weaker grip on power. Further study on inter-chamber 
differences in the General Assembly could help to clarify this question.  
Conclusion 
 Through an in-depth look at the Virginia General Assembly, my research shows that the 
applicability of informational and partisan theories can vary, not just between different 
legislatures, but within a single legislature. I found that committee organization in the General 
Assembly reflects both informational and partisan theory, with stronger evidence for partisan 
theory in the Senate. Both chambers engaged in “talent-tapping” by assigning members with 
occupation experience in certain fields to committees with relevant policy jurisdictions. The 
House attempted to limit the influence of a partisan model by adopting a proportionality 
requirement for committee assignments in 1998, which significantly decreased the frequency and 
degree of stacking on all committees except for the Rules Committee. The Senate, anecdotally 
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considered to be the more bipartisan of the two chambers, has conversely engaged in more 
partisan displays of stacking, both in terms of number of committees stacked and degree of 
stacking. The Senate also tended to create committees with median ideology scores closer to 
those of the majority party than to the chamber median, in contrast to the House. 
The comparison of Virginia House and Virginia Senate, as well as intra-chamber 
comparisons over time, show the influence of internally-imposed rules on committee 
organization. After implementing the proportional representation requirement in 1998, the House 
witnessed a significant decrease in stacking. The Senate, which never imposed a similar rule, 
continued to stack more often and to a more significant degree than the lower chamber. Possibly 
because of its stacking, the Senate also had more partisan-leaning median committee ideology 
scores than the House. Contrary to my expectation, chamber rules had a greater impact on 
committee organization than the potentially greater informational needs or bipartisan relations in 
the upper chamber.  
Inter-committee differences in the General Assembly are as significant as inter-chamber 
differences. Control committees generally tended to show more partisan characteristics than non-
control committees, as predicted by partisan theory. The Commerce Committees in particular 
showed strong partisan characteristics in terms of frequent stacking and comparatively partisan 
ideological biases, while simultaneously showing little evidence of an informational “talent-
tapping” model. By contrast, the Senate Finance Committee was frequently stacked but was 
usually closer to the chamber median than to the majority party median, thus demonstrating both 
informational and partisan characteristics. The House Appropriations Committee was not 
frequently stacked and had median ideology scores relatively closer to the chamber median than 
the majority party median. Finally, both informational and partisan theory applied to the House 
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and Senate Courts Committees. On the informational side, these committees included 
disproportionately high ratios of information specialists, and Senate Courts was stacked more 
rarely than other Senate control committees. On the partisan side, both committees had relatively 
biased median ideology scores.  
Future research on General Assembly committees might expand on this study’s analysis 
of the differences between committees. The control/non-control distinction paints with a broad 
brush, ignoring potential gradations in the importance of non-control committees. For example, 
the Senate Education and Health Committee may show more partisan characteristics than 
Transportation or Agriculture. Additionally, Rules appeared to be a strong example of partisan 
organization in both chambers, although the partisan orientation of its median ideology scores 
has varied over time. From a partisan theory perspective, former Speaker Howell’s opinion that 
Rules should not be considered a control committee may need reevaluation. 
In addition to inter-chamber and inter-committee differences, a return to this line of 
research might consider yet another line of comparison: inter-party. With the ideology scores 
available, I had access to very few years with Democratic majorities or majorities comparable to 
Republican majorities. If the two chambers continue to hold Democratic majorities in future 
sessions, new data could allow for better comparison between how the two parties organize 
committees when in power.  
As the General Assembly continues to change, observers may be able to watch the 
evolution of its committee system in real time. Beyond Virginia, more dedicated case studies of 
committee systems in America’s statehouses would go a long way towards clarifying the 
interaction between informational and partisan models across the divides of chamber, electoral 
competitiveness, and control/non-control committee.    
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Appendix A 
Tables 6 and 7 provide more precise data regarding the relationship between committee 
medians, chamber medians, and majority party medians as shown in Figures 5 and 6. By using 
Mf to represent the full chamber median, Mm to represent the majority party median, and Mc to 
represent the committee median, the tables in Appendix A show the difference between the 
absolute difference of the majority and committee medians and the absolute difference of the 
chamber and committee medians: 
|(Mm - Mc)| - |(Mf - Mc)| 
If the absolute difference between majority and committee median is less than the absolute 
difference between chamber and committee median, (|(Mm - Mc)| < |(Mf - Mc)|), then the value 
shown in Table 6 or 7 will be positive. This indicates a more informational model and confirms 
H5: the median ideology scores of committee will be closer to the median ideology score of the 
full chamber than to the median scores of the majority. If the absolute difference between 
majority and committee median is greater than the absolute difference between chamber and 
committee median, (|(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)|), then the value shown in Table 6 or 7 will be 
negative. This indicates that committees are more partisan and provides evidence against H5. A 
higher positive value indicates a more informational model, while a lower negative number 
indicates a more partisan model.  
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Table 6. |(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)| in the House, 1996-2018 
 Appropriations Commerce Courts Rules Transportation 
1996 0.22 -0.23 -0.04 0.12 0.61 
1998 (power-sharing agreement, no majority) 
2000 0.43 0.18 -0.02 0.43 -0.15 
2002 0.19 0.19 -0.10 0.19 0.11 
2004 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.06 
2006 0.25 0.25 0.09 0.16 0.15 
2008 0.26 0.24 -0.06 0.05 0.19 
2010 0.15 0.04 0.05 -0.15 0.15 
2012 0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.08 
2014 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.10 
2016 0.11 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.11 
2018 0.04 -0.13 -0.33 -0.08 -0.04 
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Table 7. |(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)| in the Senate, 1996-2018 
 Commerce Courts Finance Rules Transportation 
1996  
(power-sharing agreement, no majority) 
1998 
2000 0.20 0.23 0.18 -0.18 0.05 
2002 0.13 0.24 0.18 -0.18 0.03 
2004 -0.01 0.17 0.17 -0.02 0.08 
2006 -0.03 0.24 0.24 -0.03 0.06 
2008 0.50 0.15 0.45 -0.50 0.39 
2010 0.42 -0.24 0.37 -0.42 0.42 
2012 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.29 0.14 
2014 -0.01 -0.69 -0.69 -0.86 0.24 
2016 -0.25 -0.25 0.25 -0.19 0.10 
2018 -0.25 -0.25 0.22 -0.19 0.10 
 
 
